

What's trust got to do with it? The effects of in-group and out-group trust on conventional and unconventional political participation

Markus M.L. Crepaz – University of Georgia
mcrepaz@uga.edu

Karen Bodnaruk Jazayeri – University of Georgia
kjaz@uga.edu

Jonathan Polk – University of Gothenburg
jonathan.polk@gu.se

Objective: This paper explores whether there is a systematic variation in conventional and unconventional political participation as a function of in-group vs. out-group trust. We postulate that the narrower the moral community is, the more political participation is restricted to conventional activity that is perceived as an obligation, as a political act to be fulfilled, something akin to citizenship duty. However, individuals with high levels of out-group trust – trust in people that are different or unknown – are more likely to participate in unconventional political activities that are public in nature and transcend concepts of duty, citizenship, or nation.

Methods: To obtain measures of in-group and out-group trust we rely on various items in the 5th wave of the World Values Survey. Applying confirmatory factor analysis yields two separate forms of trust which become our central predictor variables in addition to other, theoretically derived independent variables. We employ logistic regression with country cluster robust standard errors.

Results and conclusion: The results support our central assertions, even when controlling for the standard measure of generalized trust and a number of other factors. Individuals with higher in-group trust report having voted at higher levels than individuals with lower in-group trust. Individuals with higher levels of out-group trust, however, participate more actively in non-conventional political activity. Surprisingly, the presence of out-group trust has a slightly negative impact on voting. Our findings further emphasize the importance of differentiating between types of interpersonal trust, and answer recent calls for empirical research on the impact of forms of trust on political behavior.

*Direct all correspondence to: Dr. Markus M. L. Crepaz, University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs, Athens, GA 30602. Office phone: (706) 542-2947. E-mail: mcrepaz@uga.edu. The data and code necessary for replication will be available at jonathanpolk.net. All authors contributed equally to this research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2014 American Political Science Association, 2014 European Political Science Association, 2014 Midwest Political Science

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A vibrant democracy depends on an active citizenry that is engaged in the political process not only via voting, but also via unconventional forms of political participation such as demonstrations, boycotts, and petitions. If civic engagement is the linchpin of democracy (Putnam, 1993) and if it is true that “interpersonal trust is probably the moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be maintained” (Poggi, 1972, 59) we need a better understanding of the relationship between forms of trust and types of political participation. Democracy requires public-spiritedness, participation and active engagement that is inclusionary and reaches beyond one’s personal and immediate interests. Could there be a systematic variation in types of political participation as a function of how inclusionary or exclusionary trust is? Recent studies have found systematic differences in political participation between particularized trusters and generalized trusters (Uslaner and Conley 2003) and there is a growing interest in how different forms of trust impact political attitudes and behaviors (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton and Zmerli 2011). However, very little is known about how higher or lower levels of trust affect participation in different types of political activity. For example, are there differences along the spectrum of in-group or out-group trust on political participation, namely voting, demonstrations, or boycotts?

Here, we argue that specific forms of trust, namely in-group and out-group trust (Delhey et al. 2011)¹ – although highly correlated with one another – affect conventional and unconventional political activity in systematically different ways. More specifically, in-group trust, i.e. the trust between similar types of people, is associated with increased participation in electoral politics compared to out-group trust, i.e. the trust between those that are different. When it comes to participating in demonstrations, boycotts and petition drives, however, the relationship switches, and the presence of higher levels of out-group trust makes it more likely that an individual will take part in these less conventional actions, whereas high levels of in-group trust actually make this type of participation less likely.

In-group trusters are more inclined to take part in conventional political action and are also less likely to participate in unconventional political activity because they perceive the traditional channels of political participation, namely voting, to be legitimate and sufficient for citizens to register their preferences. In-group trusters perceive voting as an obligation - something that one has to do in order to generate a sense of political identity and belonging to the nation. They are mostly concerned with issues that affect their private interests directly, i.e. local political issues and political topics that are removed from their more direct interests will generate little activity on the part of in-group trusters.

Different considerations motivate individuals with high levels of out-group trust. They believe that conventional political activity is not sufficient to change political outcomes, and are driven to less conventional political activities by concerns that extend beyond immediate political boundaries to encompass issues that span larger, even global spheres. Out-group trusters tend to be other-regarding, but we stress that this does not mean that out-group trusters are

¹ We follow Delhey et. al.'s terminology of in-group and out-group trust because it is particularly helpful in distinguishing between these types of trust and the standard measurement of generalized trust discussed throughout this paper.

selfless. Unconventional political participation provides a sense of self-esteem, of being part of a broader community for those with high amounts of out-group trust, whereas respondents with in-group trust appear to find their identity as citizens via participating in the more formalized voting process.

This paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we take stock of the literature on the impact of interpersonal trust on conventional and unconventional political behavior. This is followed by our theory of why we expect in-group and out-group trust to systematically affect conventional and unconventional political behavior in different ways. We then proceed to our empirical test using data on these two forms of trust from eleven OECD countries included in the 5th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The conclusion explores the implications of our research and suggests further areas of study, focusing on the importance of supplementing the standard generalized trust question with more nuanced, multi-dimensional measures of interpersonal trust.

Taking Stock: Interpersonal Trust and Forms of Participation

Following the work of Putnam (1993, 2000) the link between interpersonal trust and political participation has been a particular topic of interest. However, there is little consensus on how interpersonal trust influences political participation. Fennema and Tillie (2001), and Putnam (1993, 2000) find a positive connection between social trust and political participation. Kaase (1999) delves deeper into this relationship with results confirming what social capital theorists would expect, that generalized trust and unconventional political activity are strongly and positively related. High levels of interpersonal trust are associated with widening one's political repertoire (Kaase 1999, 17). Cox (2003) further confirms the relationship between trust and political participation, although there may be an indirect relationship between voting behavior

and trust. Cox (2003, 766) finds that more trusting individuals also have greater trust in political institutions and electoral turnout is significantly and positively related to the level of trust in political institutions. More recently, Nickerson (2008, 54) finds evidence that the inclination to vote may increase when one has a higher degree of trust, intimacy, and social interactions with other voters.

Others suggest a weak or non-existent relationship between social trust and political participation (van Deth 2001; and Muhlberger; 2003). Brehm and Rahn (1997), Claibourn and Martin (2000), and Shah (1998) find either weak or insignificant relationships between generalized trust and civic engagement. People who trust other people may have little incentive to organize collective action (Claibourn 2000). Harder and Krosnick (2008, 535) suggest low levels of interpersonal trust might motivate turnout if low trust motivates people to take action to minimize the damage they fear others might inflict.

From this it appears that the connection between social trust and different forms of political participation is inconclusive at best. However, a different conceptualization and data analysis of trust may alleviate the present quandary. These inconsistent findings could be a consequence of what an increasing number of scholars argue is an overly broad definition and measure of generalized trust (see, e.g., Muhlberger 2003; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Gundelach 2014). The current conception and measure of generalized trust “captures some average of more particular types of trust” (Muhlberger 2003, 9). The implications of these concerns are that if generalized trust captures various levels of trust, it is necessary to find a better measure and take care to disaggregate between various forms of trust.

Theory and Hypotheses

Recent research suggests that individuals with high levels of in-group trust are more likely to find it unacceptable to cheat on taxes or avoid paying fares on public transportation (Crepaz et al. 2014). Interestingly, however, out-group trust was found to be either insignificant in its impact on these attitudes, or actually associated with more permissive stances towards “fare dodging.” In this section, we further examine these two types of trust in order to explain why we expect that individuals with higher in-group trust will be more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation, while individuals with higher out-group trust are more likely to participate in less conventional types of political actions.

We suspect that the orbit of trust affects what in-group trusters consider as traditional political participation. We postulate that the narrower their political perception of the moral community is, the more political participation is restricted to conventional activity that is perceived as an obligation, as a political act to be fulfilled, something akin to citizenship duty. This leads us to expect that in-group trust will be associated with more conservative attitudes on questions pertaining to civic duty. Individuals with more restrictive forms of identity and trust are likely to possess the moral obligations and sense of duty that Blais and St. Vincent (2011) highlight as increasing the propensity to vote. These qualities bring about a sensitivity to social pressures for conventional participation that enables individuals to overcome a dilemma highlighted in the rational choice literature, which suggests that the egocentric individual should abstain from voting (Gerber et al 2008; Blais and St. Vincent 2011). In this, we agree with the assertion that “different forms of cooperation are based on different forms of trust, and that the application of the most intensively studied trust form – generalized trust – may be limited in some contexts” (Wollebæk et al. 2012, 325). These authors go on to stress the importance of

spatially and personally bounded trust for more focused types of cooperation². Although this form of trust is limited in its reach, in-group trust is important in fostering civically oriented attitudes (Newton and Zmerli 2011), and a number of scholars emphasize its necessity for the viability of modern welfare states (Marshall 1950; Walzer 1983; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Goodhart 2004; Miller 2000; Huntington 2004).

Connecting the insights of social psychology on the dynamics of in- and out-groups with our distinction between in-group and out-group trust, we expect in-group trusters to see voting in national elections as a mechanism by which to identify with the nation. Voting serves to express their sense of tradition and a clearly demarcated, spatially bound understanding of voting as a “duty”. Voting is purposive, not instrumental – the act in itself is important. It becomes a matter of doing the right thing out of a sense of loyalty to the nation. In-group trusters prefer to channel their political participation through the legal, highly structured and “proper” process via regular elections. These attitudes may be bolstered by messages in news and entertainment outlets reminding citizens before elections that the act of voting itself is crucial for the maintenance of democracy. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: Individuals with high levels of in-group trust will be more likely to participate in conventional forms of political participation than individuals with low levels of in-group trust.

Out-group trust becomes crucial in creating cooperation that is neither spatially nor personally bounded, when the cooperation stretches beyond kith and kin, and extends to strangers and distant polities (Wollebæk, et al. 2012). Much like cosmopolitanism, out-group trust drives non-conventional forms of political participation. Cosmopolitanism encourages people to look beyond their socio-political units in defining their moral community (Singer

² Wollebæk et al. uses a three dimensional model of social trust distinguishing between particularized, community, and generalized trust. Another recent article makes use of new data from Switzerland to draw distinctions between particularized, identity-based, and generalized trust (Freitag and Bauer 2013).

2002), and runs counter to nationalist or communitarian ideas that the principles of distributive justice apply most readily to a particular subset of the global population (Sandel 1982). For some, the emphasis on individuals rather than collectivities makes up a key element of what it means to be cosmopolitan (Dobson 2006), and cosmopolitans are more likely to view people who do not belong to a given society, nation, or community as equally valuable to those that do (Scheffler 1999; Erskine 2000). Thus, although non-traditional political participation is a pro-social behavior, it is less constrained by the boundaries of the nation-state.

Unconventional political behavior is elicited by those who are galvanized by the importance of political issues such as global warming or boycotts of particular products, often referred to as *buycotts* (products based on animal testing, devices containing “conflict minerals” or “blood diamonds” for instance). Micheletti et al. (2003, 45) called these activities “political consumerism” defined as “consumer choice of producers and products based on political or ethical considerations, or both” (Stolle et al. 2005, 246). Activists engaged in such behavior have a sense of high political efficacy (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, 2005), and believe that their actions can ‘bend the needle’ in their preferred direction. Not only do they believe that parts of society need to be changed, but also more importantly, that they *can* change it. Dissatisfaction with certain aspects of society, combined with a belief in personal efficacy, works as a positive motivator for unconventional political participation, rather than diminishing it.

Out-group trusters are “other regarding”, altruistic and extroverted (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, 2005). Their participatory personality has a capacity to transcend national borders (Crepaz, 2008). They may see that the act of voting alone as insufficient to solve the collective problems at hand. For them the motivation of political participation lies not only in individual enrichment but also in the pursuit of the common good, broadly understood. We therefore expect

individuals with higher amounts of out-group trust to engage more in peaceful protests, boycotts, and petition drives, which leads to our next hypothesis:

H2: Individuals with high levels of out-group trust will be more likely to participate in unconventional forms of political participation than individuals with low levels of out-group trust.

Conversely, we expect in-group trusters to participate less in unconventional forms of political participation. Peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and petition drives may include “large” political issues, and are often connected to public goods ranging from national to global issues. For this hypothesis, the type of good becomes crucial. In-group trusters will engage less in unconventional forms of political participation if the good is “public” in nature, i.e. the good does not produce direct pay-offs for their membership.³ We should see a smaller number of in-group trusters protesting for human rights at a prominent intergovernmental meeting or the freeing of political prisoners in faraway places. We expect in-group trusters to be less interested in this type of political activity, as their political interests are oriented to ordered and structured political processes.

Moreover, since in-group trusters tend to be more law-abiding (Crepaz et al. 2014) and rigid, they may perceive unconventional political behavior as “out of bounds” or even dangerous to the political system. Their more limited scope of community could lead them to believe that they should “fall in line” with domestic, national issues, which leads them to turn away from unconventional forms of political behavior. Thus, our third hypothesis:

H3: Individuals with high levels of in-group trust will be less likely to participate in unconventional forms of political participation than individuals with low levels of in-group trust.

Data and Research Design

³ Alternately, we expect in-group trusters to be highly engaged in narrower political areas involving private goods which in-group trusters value highly.

To examine the validity of the hypotheses outlined above, we subject the argument to an analysis encompassing eleven countries with a total of 13,051 respondents.⁴ The countries included are: Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. We constrain our sample to industrialized societies for two reasons: first, we want to keep as many potentially confounding effects, such as degrees of democracy, development levels, or comparability of central concepts among respondents at bay. Second, the data used for some variables of interest are restricted to this sample of Western European countries, Australia, and the United States.⁵ We explore the hypotheses with data obtained from the 2005 World Values Survey. The dependent variables are obtained from WVS questions that capture political participation. Question V234, voting, serves as the dependent variable measuring conventional political activities. Questions V100, V101, V102, petition, boycott, demonstration, respectively, provide measures of unconventional political activities. The responses are coded 0 if the respondent did not participate and 1 if the respondent did participate in these activities.

Our measures of in-group and out-group trust are obtained from Crepaz et al. (2014), which utilizes questions from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey to estimate two confirmatory factor models (CFAs), yielding separate dimensions of trust. Results from the CFAs provide individual factor scores for in-group and out-group trusters. The factor scores produce a continuous measurement of trust within each particular group, where three observed indicators are causally connected to each type of trust. Four-point scale questions about trust in family, neighbors, and personal acquaintances (V125-V127) are connected with the in-group trust factor, and four-point scale questions about trust in people of different religions,

⁴ The number of observations differs in each regression model due to missing data.

⁵ See Torpe and Lolle (2011) and Frietag and Bauer (2013) for discussion of, and opposing viewpoints on, comparability in respondents' understanding of survey questions across cultural contexts.

nationalities, and new acquaintances (V128-130) are connected with the out-group trust factor. Lower values indicate less trust and higher values indicate greater trust within each dimension. In all of the models that follow, we include both in-group and out-group measures of trust.⁶ We also include a variable to account for the influence of generalized trust (the WVS standard trust question, V23) to insure that in-group and out-group trust influence political participation beyond their association with generalized trust. We also include four models without the standard generalized trust question to determine the independent relationship of in-group and out-group trust.

Although we expect stark contrasts in the effects of in-group and out-group trust on different types of political participation, interestingly, these variables correlated with one another at .8, which suggests that even though distinct they are interrelated.⁷ We remain aware of this fact as we move through the analysis. We also disaggregate the trust measures to assess the correlation of in-group and out-group trusters at the lower, middle, and upper range. Interestingly, we find much lower correlations between the disaggregated categories. Low levels of in-group trust correlate with low levels of out-group trust at .40; mid-levels of in-group trust correlate with mid-levels of out-group trust at .52; and high levels of in-group trust correlate with high levels of out-group trust at .54. Strikingly, however, both in- and out-group trust only correlate with the standard generalized trust measure at .34, providing preliminary empirical evidence that in- and out-group trust are measuring something other than what is captured in the normal trust question.

Previous research suggests a wide variety of factors influence political participation and need to be controlled for in statistical models. Reflecting on the idea that life satisfaction is

⁶ The appendix presents descriptive statistics for our trust measures and the other variables in our analyses.

⁷ We expect few people are high on one type of trust and low on the other. In fact, a majority of observations for in-group measure of trust (65%) and out-group measure of trust (71%) are in the middle range.

positively related to civic and political participation (Meier and Stutzer, 2008; Klar and Kasser 2009, 771), we include a control variable which ranges from 1-to-10 with lower values indicating dissatisfaction with one's life and higher values indicating satisfaction. Scholarship has found that age has a significant influence on one's propensity to vote as well as participate in unconventional political activities. Older people are more likely to vote at higher rates (Turner, Shields, and Sharpe 2001; Harder and Krosnick 2008). However, the effect of age on extra-electoral participation is ambiguous.⁸ We include a control variable for age measured in years. To account for the effect of gender on political participation we include a dichotomous variable accounting for gender with females coded as 1 and males 0. Education has been found to positively influence both voting and protest participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Harder and Krosnick 2008; Mondak et al. 2011). It may also be the case that education more than or in conjunction with out-group trust explains other-regarding preferences. We therefore include a control variable for education measured on a nine point ordinal scale, ranging from no formal education, coded 1, to completed university education, coded 9. To control for the effect of income on political participation we include a variable measuring income sorted into 10 strata within each country (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Stoker and Jennings 1995). We also include a control variable accounting for any influence of political ideology, particularly to account for the possibility that in-group trust could be related to conservatism and out-group trust to more left-liberal attitudes. Left-right placement is measured with a question asking individuals to report their ideology, with 1 indicating 'left' and 10 indicating 'right'. Political interest may also play an important role in one's propensity to vote and/or engage in unconventional political activities (Verba and Nie, 1987). The variable measuring political interest is obtained from WVS V95.

⁸ See also Mondak et al. (2011), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and Newman and Bartels (2011) for different effects of age on political participation.

Answers range on a scale from 1-to-4 with a value of 1 assigned to individuals who are ‘less interested’ and 4 assigned to individuals ‘who are very interested’. Last, we include a dummy variable to account for compulsory voting. In our sample Australia instituted compulsory voting during the 5th wave of the WVS.

Empirical Analysis

To analyze the relationship between our two forms of trust and political participation we estimate logistic regression models. Country clustered standard errors account for correlation within the residuals occurring at the country level. The number of observations varies across models, as response rates fluctuated by question.⁹

Our hypotheses are supported in the analyses, as shown in Table 1. Taken together, the results indicate that different types of trust have a significant and substantive effect on the type of political participation a person is likely to engage in. Interestingly, generalized trust is only significant in increasing the likelihood of voting. The effect is consistent with in-group trust. These diverging results indicate that the specified in-group and out-group trust measures capture something different from the uni-dimensional trust question. Below, we outline these results and discuss the substantive effects of the findings. We divide the discussion into two parts with each section discussing related hypotheses.

Table 1 (about here)

Beginning with the results concerning unconventional participation in models 3-8, which specifically address hypotheses 2 and 3, we find, as expected, that as out-group trust increases individuals are more likely to participate in unconventional political activities. Conversely, as in-

⁹ See the first table of Appendix A for summary statistics for all variables of interest.

group trust increases individuals are less likely to participate. These results are consistent for participation in demonstrations, boycotts, and signing a petition.

To more fully interpret the results of the models we calculate and plot the predicted probability of political participation (model including the generalized trust). Figure 1 displays the relationship between the trust variables and likelihood of signing a petition. Substantively these results indicate how influential different types of trust are on an individual's propensity to sign a petition. As shown in the top panel of the figure, as out-group trust increases individuals are more likely to sign a petition. Conversely, as in-group trust increases individuals are less likely to sign a petition. A standard deviation change in the trust measures centered on the mean (dichotomous variables at mode) will decrease the probability of signing a petition among in-group trusters by 3 percentage points and increase the probability of signing a petition among out-group trusters by 7 percentage points.¹⁰ With all other covariates held at their mean, or mode if dichotomous, as the key independent variables move from their minimum to maximum scores within each measure of trust, an in-group truster is 20 percentage points less likely to sign a petition and an out-group truster is 36 percentage points more likely to sign a petition.

Figure 1 (about here)

The patterns in Figures 2 and 3 are similar, with out-group trusters more willing to participate in boycotts and demonstrations and in-group trusters less likely to do so.

Figure 2 (about here)

More specifically, along the continuums of trust a standard deviation change in the trust measures centered on the mean (or mode if dichotomous) will decrease the probability of

¹⁰ From a ½ standard deviation below the mean to a ½ standard deviation above.

participating in a boycott among in-group trusters by 2 percentage points and increase the probability of participating in a boycott among out-group trusters by 3 percentage points. With all other covariates held at their mean, or mode if dichotomous, as the key independent variables move from their minimum to maximum scores, an in-group truster is 17 percentage points less likely to participate in a boycott and an out-group truster is 19 percentage points more likely to participate in a boycott. The predicted probabilities for demonstration are very similar. A standard deviation change in the trust measures decreases participation in a demonstration among in-group trusters by 2 percentage points and increases among out-group trusters by 2 percentage points. As the key independent variables move from their minimum to maximum scores of trust, along each continuum, in-group trusters are 12 percentage points less likely to participate in a demonstration and out-group trusters are 11 percentage points more likely to participate in a demonstration.

Figure 3 (about here)

Regarding the remaining control variables, age, ideology, education, and political interest yield consistent results. Younger individuals and individuals with greater political interest are more likely to participate in less conventional acts. Ideology also has an important influence. Individuals who are farther to the left ideologically are more likely to participate in unconventional political activities. People with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in all forms of unconventional activities. We find quite different results among the remaining significant covariates. In the petition and boycott models, increased income has a positive effect on increasing the likelihood of participation; however, income does not have a significant relationship with demonstration. The insignificant effect of income on protest is not surprising. Both Newman and Bartels (2011, 811) and Mondak et al. (2011) find that increased

income is not a significant predictor of protest participation. We find that females are more likely to participate in petitions, but less likely to participate in demonstrations. There is no statistically significant relationship between sex and participating in a boycott. Regarding the demonstration model specifically, we find that individuals with greater life satisfaction are not as likely to participate in a demonstration.

Turning now to participation in conventional political activity, specifically hypothesis one, results from models 1-2 provide evidence that in-group trusters are more likely to vote, while, interestingly, out-group trusters are somewhat less likely to do so. The association remains even when controlling for generalized trust. All significant control variables are in the expected direction. Specifically, older, higher educated, wealthier, and people with higher life satisfaction are more likely to vote. In addition, people more interested in politics are more likely to vote. To more fully interpret the results of models 1 and 2, we calculate and plot the predicted probability of voting (model including TTQ). These values are displayed in Figure 4.

Figure 4 (about here)

Substantively these results indicate how influential different types of trust are on an individual's propensity to vote. As shown in the figure, as in-group trust increases, individuals are more likely to vote. Conversely, as out-group trust increases, individuals are less likely to vote. Looking at the specific effects of more or less trust measured along the separate continuum shows that there are substantial differences in voting behavior. A standard deviation change in the trust measures centered on the mean (with dichotomous variables at mode) will decrease the probability of voting among out-group trusters by 2 percentage points and increase the probability of voting among in-group trusters by or 3 percentage points. With all other covariates

held at their mean, or mode if dichotomous, as the key independent variables move from their minimum to maximum scores, an in-group truster with a maximum score of trust is 19 percentage points more likely to vote than an in-group truster with the minimum score of trust. An out-group truster with a minimum score is 10 percentage points more likely to vote than one at the maximum.

Cosmopolitanism, country effects, and political interest?

To confirm that these findings are robust to various specifications we examine variables that may influence political participation or act as a proxy for different types of trust. First, research has shown that individual personality traits, as measured by the ‘Big Five’ personality model, exert considerable influence on the foundations of democratic citizenship (Dinesen et al. 2014). Perhaps our measures of out- and in-group trust are actually measuring individual’s psychological characteristics, such as openness to experience or cosmopolitanism, rather than trust as such. To address this concern, we ran a separate regression that includes a variable asking respondents how much they see themselves as a world citizen (WVS question V210) to account for an individual’s degree of cosmopolitanism. The variable ranges from 1-to-4 with lower values indicating higher levels of cosmopolitanism. Further, respondents with high values on the cosmopolitan question, i.e. those that do not see themselves as world citizens, would necessarily have a more narrowly defined identity, and by extension have more interest in traditional conceptions of citizenship. This cosmopolitan variable therefore parsimoniously also helps control for the possible impact of an interest in tradition and order.

Results, Table 2, suggest that in-group and out-group trusters engage in different types of political participation, despite the inclusion of cosmopolitanism. Surprisingly, cosmopolitanism only has a significant effect on voting and demonstrations. People who are less likely to identify

themselves as a world citizen are more likely to vote. Those who are more likely to identify as a world citizen are more likely to participate in demonstrations. We would expect people who are more cosmopolitan to engage in demonstrations, boycotts, and petitions as their identity as a global citizen would attract them to activities that may be associated with issues that involve public goods and are not bounded by conceptions of identity that are centered on nation, religion, race, or ethnicity. Furthermore, the globalization of economic markets should encourage those with global identities to participate in boycotts (Andersen and Tobiasen 2003, 216).

Table 2 (about here)

Second, there is the possibility that the hypothesized relationships are pertinent in some countries, but not others. To account for the possibility that some countries are particularly influential we ran a regression using unit specific effects. The results in Table 3 are consistent with our hypotheses as outlined in the earlier discussion.¹¹

Table 3 (about here)

Third, we ran a regression analysis excluding political interest, a particularly significant control variable substantively and statistically. The results, Table 4, suggest that our expectations for trust remain in the hypothesized direction. Table 4 (about here) Whether including a measure of cosmopolitanism, using random effects models, or removing political interest, our primary empirical results presented in the main table (Table 1) hold.¹²

Conclusions and Implications

This article has presented evidence that different forms of interpersonal trust produce systematic and differing impacts on political participation. Across our sample, survey

¹¹ We removed the dummy variable for compulsory vote in this model. The unit effects model should account for this difference between countries.

¹² We also conducted tests to assess the interaction effect between the two types of trust. The empirical results are consistent with what is presented in the main table (Table 1). See table A.2 and A.3 of the appendix.

respondents with higher levels of in-group trust were more likely to report having voted in the previous election than respondents with less in-group trust. The relationship between voting and out-group trust, however, is precisely the opposite; the presence of out-group trust slightly reduces reported voting in survey respondents. More importantly, the trust-participation connection changes in analyses of less conventional forms of political participation. Here, it is individuals with higher levels out-group trust that are more likely to have reported participating in these activities, while in-group trust tends to decrease this sort of political participation.

These findings make several contributions to our understanding of interpersonal trust and open new areas for further theoretical and empirical investigation. First, this study provides compelling evidence that the disaggregation of interpersonal trust found in the theoretical scholarship on this topic has important empirical implications. Although the two types of trust we focus on in this article are closely correlated with one another, they are associated with very different patterns of political participation. Trust that extends to individuals in relatively close proximity, but not beyond, generates civic attitudes and behavior within the confines of a discrete political unit. Out-group trust, however, is more cosmopolitan. People with high trust in those of a different religion or nationality appear to put less stock in political action that is bound by the nation state. This type of trust leads individuals to engage in more interactive, less conventional political acts than people with more a more narrow sense of trust. These empirical patterns of in-group and out-group trust systematically affecting different types of political participation calls for additional theorizing and investigation.

Second, from a methodological perspective, our findings indicate that the traditional, single item measure of generalized trust does not capture nuances that are present in interpersonal trust. The relationships between in-group and out-group trust and political activity

reported in this paper all hold with and without the standard generalized trust question included in the regressions. We interpret this not only as an important validity check on our central argument, particularly that out-group trust exerts an impact on attitudes and reported behavior independent of generalized trust, but also as further support for multi-item batteries of trust questions in subsequent surveys that attempt to measure interpersonal trust.

Future research should investigate the content of petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations in more fine-grained detail and more extensively examine the interaction of types of trust with other political attitudes and political activities. We have shown that in-group trust proves crucial in mobilizing political activity that is centered on more narrow conceptions of identity, based either on conceptions of nation, region, or locality, or race, and ethnicity – in other words, political activities that are closer to home. Conversely, out-group trusters have the capacity to transcend narrow identities and to engage in the pursuit of political goals that go beyond their immediate self interest. Such attitudes make it possible to rally around public goods issues such as environmental protection that knows no specific beneficiary. Producing these kinds of outcomes requires trust beyond borders.

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Table 1: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation

	Vote		Petition		Boycott		Demonstration	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Out-group Trust	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.05)
In-group Trust	0.27*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.09)	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.22*** (0.08)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)
Generalized Trust	-	0.17* (0.10)	-	-0.01 (0.07)	-	0.13 (0.09)	-	0.04 (0.14)

Life Satisfaction	0.04** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)
Female	0.11 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.17** (0.07)
Income	0.05** (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Education	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.03)	-0.27*** (0.03)
Political Interest	0.55*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.52*** (0.08)	0.51*** (0.08)	0.56*** (0.07)	0.56*** (0.07)
Compulsory Vote	1.60*** (0.14)	1.62*** (0.14)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	-3.27*** (0.44)	-3.42*** (0.48)	-1.23*** (0.41)	-1.24*** (0.46)	-3.41*** (0.45)	-3.59*** (0.47)	-1.73** (0.49)	-1.78*** (0.57)
<i>N</i>	10,186	9,945	9,511	9,293	9,058	8,844	9,084	8,869
Log-likelihood	-3936	-3845	-5921	-5784	-3333	-3260	-3433	-3356

Logistic regressions with country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Table 2: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation, Cosmopolitanism

	Vote		Petition		Boycott		Demonstration	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Out-Group Trust	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.13* (0.07)	0.11 (0.08)
In-Group Trust	0.27** (0.12)	0.24** (0.12)	-0.23*** (0.09)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.12)	-0.30*** (0.11)
Generalized Trust	-	0.13 (0.08)	-	0.05 (0.06)	-	0.14 (0.09)	-	0.17 (0.12)
Life Satisfaction	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.002 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Age	0.04*** (0.004)	0.04*** (0.004)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.003)
Female	0.05 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.18** (0.09)
Income	0.06** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Education	0.20*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
Ideology	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)
Political Interest	0.58*** (0.10)	0.57*** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.06)	0.49*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.64*** (0.07)	0.64*** (0.07)
Cosmopolitanism	0.21*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.19** (0.08)
Compulsory Vote	1.62*** (0.17)	1.64*** (0.17)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	-3.92*** (0.67)	-4.07*** (0.72)	-0.87* (0.46)	-0.91* (0.50)	-3.14*** (0.55)	-3.30*** (0.51)	-1.79** (0.72)	-1.99*** (0.70)
<i>N</i>	7,836	7,644	7,385	7,207	7,295	7,120	7,322	7,146
Log-likelihood	-2814.41	-2747.89	-4573.64	-4460.01	-2748.587	-2691.495	-2653.97	-2591.08

Logistic regressions with country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation, Unit Effects

	Vote		Petition		Boycott		Demonstration	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Out-group Trust	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
In-group Trust	0.25*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)
Generalized Trust	-	0.16** (0.06)	-	-0.01 (0.05)	-	0.14* (0.07)	-	0.04*** (0.07)
Life Satisfaction	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.05 (0.02)
Age	0.04*** (0.002)	0.04*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.002)
Female	0.13** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)
Income	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education	0.19*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.02)
Political Interest	0.52*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.04)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.56*** (0.04)	0.56*** (0.04)
Constant	-3.32*** (0.20)	-3.48*** (0.21)	-1.23*** (0.15)	-1.24*** (0.16)	-3.41*** (0.24)	-3.59*** (0.25)	-1.73*** (0.22)	-1.78*** (0.23)
<i>N</i>	10,186	9,945	9,511	9,293	9,058	8,844	9,084	8,869
Log-likelihood	-4013.56	-3923.70	-5921.26	-5784.84	-3333.78	-3260.93	-3433.54	-3356.55

Logistic regressions with unit specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 4: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation

	Vote		Petition		Boycott		Demonstration	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Out-Group Trust	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.06)
In-Group Trust	0.25*** (0.08)	0.22*** (0.08)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.11)	-0.24** (0.11)
Generalized Trust	-	0.27*** (0.10)	-	0.05 (0.08)	-	0.20* (0.102)	-	0.12 (0.12)
Life Satisfaction	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.001 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age	0.04*** (0.004)	0.04*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01** (0.003)
Female	0.01 (0.09)	0.002 (0.09)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.07)
Income	0.06** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Education	0.21*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.06)	-0.15*** (0.06)	-0.29*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.03)
Compulsory Vote	1.49*** (0.13)	1.51*** (0.12)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	-2.48*** (0.37)	-2.75*** (0.38)	-0.70* (0.39)	-0.77* (0.43)	-2.48*** (0.42)	-2.72*** (0.44)	-0.77** (0.33)	-0.89** (0.37)
<i>N</i>	10,208	9,967	9,534	9,316	9,080	8,866	9,107	8,892
Log-likelihood	-4087.32	-3989.31	-6037.59	-5898.50	-3423.68	-3347.22	-3547.80	-3468.41

Logistic regressions with country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

Independent Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
In Trust	0.00006	0.90	-3.50	2.07
Out Trust	0.00005	1.52	-4.34	3.90
Gen. Trust	1.45	.50	1	2
Life Sat	7.41	1.78	1	10
Age	48.11	17.29	15	95
Gender	0.52	0.50	0	1
Income	4.86	2.51	1	10
Education	5.87	2.23	1	9
Left-Right	5.30	2.00	1	10
Pol. Interest	2.52	0.93	1	4
Comp. Vote	0.11	0.31	0	1
Dependent Variables				
Vote	0.81	0.39	0	1
Petition	0.56	0.49	0	1
Boycott	0.13	0.34	0	1
Demonstration	0.15	0.35	0	1

We also look at the interaction effect between the two types of trust- in-group and out-group trust. Table A.2 is the full model specification. Results for the in-group and out-group trust are statistically significant and the direction of the effect is consistent with the results in Table 1. In Table A.3 we remove the general trust variable. The results for in-group and out-group trust are robust and statistically significant.

Table A.2: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation, Including Interaction Term

VARIABLES	(1) Voted	(2) Demonstration	(3) Boycott	(4) Petition
Out-Group Trust	-0.101*** (0.0213)	0.141*** (0.0523)	0.223*** (0.0502)	0.198*** (0.0376)
In-Group Trust	0.254*** (0.0902)	-0.194* (0.109)	-0.247*** (0.0851)	-0.153* (0.0832)
Generalized Trust	0.171* (0.0976)	0.0354 (0.145)	0.133 (0.0973)	-0.0120 (0.0777)
Interaction	0.00760 (0.0251)	-0.00641 (0.0197)	-0.0116 (0.0224)	-0.0546* (0.0309)
Life Satisfaction	0.0380** (0.0170)	-0.0482** (0.0223)	-0.0161 (0.0297)	-0.0134 (0.0308)
Political Interest	0.540*** (0.0836)	0.563*** (0.0745)	0.511*** (0.0786)	0.374*** (0.0459)
Ideology	0.0179 (0.0154)	-0.268*** (0.0298)	-0.133** (0.0551)	-0.0646*** (0.0235)
Female	0.112 (0.101)	-0.168** (0.0721)	0.0642 (0.0758)	0.303*** (0.0702)
Income	0.0516** (0.0248)	-0.0189 (0.0176)	0.0639** (0.0274)	0.0569** (0.0234)
Compulsory Vote	1.619*** (0.137)			
Age	0.0404*** (0.00365)	-0.0149*** (0.00310)	-0.0105*** (0.00268)	-0.00903** (0.00370)
Cosmopolitanism	0.148*** (0.0293)	0.152*** (0.0190)	0.159*** (0.0246)	0.171*** (0.0254)
Constant	-3.435*** (0.470)	-1.762*** (0.582)	-3.563*** (0.480)	-1.143** (0.492)
Observations	9,945	8,869	8,844	9,293
Log-likelihood	-3845.36	-3356.48	-3260.75	-5776.02

Logistic regressions with country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Trust and Conventional and Unconventional Participation, Including Interaction Term

VARIABLES	(1) Voted	(2) Demonstration	(3) Boycott	(4) Petition
Out-Group Trust	-0.0968*** (0.0212)	0.145*** (0.0464)	0.223*** (0.0518)	0.202*** (0.0411)
In-Group Trust	0.272*** (0.0912)	-0.189* (0.107)	-0.216** (0.0854)	-0.160* (0.0822)
Interaction	0.00751 (0.0259)	-0.00792 (0.0179)	-0.0138 (0.0215)	-0.0567* (0.0301)
Life Satisfaction	0.0427** (0.0173)	-0.0478** (0.0212)	-0.0155 (0.0316)	-0.0132 (0.0317)
Political Interest	0.546*** (0.0840)	0.560*** (0.0740)	0.515*** (0.0762)	0.373*** (0.0466)
Ideology	0.0197 (0.0145)	-0.269*** (0.0303)	-0.135** (0.0555)	-0.0651*** (0.0240)
Female	0.114 (0.0992)	-0.161** (0.0692)	0.0580 (0.0753)	0.307*** (0.0701)
Income	0.0502** (0.0253)	-0.0211 (0.0174)	0.0660** (0.0261)	0.0558** (0.0234)
Compulsory Vote	1.607*** (0.140)	-	-	-
Age	0.0406*** (0.00380)	-0.0149*** (0.00305)	-0.0110*** (0.00256)	-0.00922** (0.00367)
Cosmopolitanism	0.154*** (0.0292)	0.155*** (0.0173)	0.164*** (0.0254)	0.170*** (0.0264)
Constant	-3.277*** (0.445)	-1.715*** (0.500)	-3.389*** (0.459)	-1.142*** (0.434)
Observations	10,186	9,084	9,058	9,511
Log-Likelihood	-3936.32	-3433.44	-3333.51	-5911.59

Logistic regressions with country-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1