Trust Matters: The Impact of Ingroup and Outgroup Trust on Nativism and Civicness*

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Objectives. The objectives of this study are threefold: first, we separate trust into a two-dimensional concept: ingroup trust and outgroup trust. Second, we apply both types of trust to two dependent variables: nativism and civicness, hypothesizing that respondents with ingroup trust should display higher degrees of nativism and lower degrees of civicness while the opposite should apply to respondents with outgroup trust. Third, we control for the traditional trust question in order to determine whether there is any value added by separating trust into two dimensions.

Methods. After applying confirmatory factor analysis to a six-item measure in the fifth (2005/2006) wave of the World Values Survey, we identify two kinds of trust—“ingroup” and “outgroup.” We then use various regressions (linear, ordered logistic, and binary logistic) to estimate their effects on different measures of nativism and civicness.

Results. Our results indicate that despite the existence of a moderately strong positive correlation between the two trust measures, once applied to four models of nativism and three models of civicness, these have statistically significant and different relationships, even when controlling for traditional generalized trust.

Conclusions. Our conclusions suggest that outgroup trust reduces nativism while ingroup trust tends to increase it, and, counter to expectations, we find that while ingroup trust varies positively and significantly with civicness measures, outgroup trust does not.

As modern societies become more diverse as a result of immigration, what role do different types of trust play in affecting the relationship between natives and newcomers? Similarly, what is the role of types of trust in determining an individual’s willingness to contribute to the common good? Hardly any policy area demarcates so starkly the difference between “us” and “them” as

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the relationship between natives and immigrants. Even among citizens, there are differences in the degree to which some people are willing to contribute to the welfare of others; to show solidarity with those less fortunate; to care about the lives of neighbors, of people in different stations in life, of different religions, gender, age, or strangers in the countryside or the far-off capital of their nation.

We argue that orbits of trust—for example, the degree to which individuals understand other people to be either “like them,” based on spatial, racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, class, and other proximities, or whether they perceive others to be different along these categories—can help us understand relationships between natives and newcomers. The wider this circle of cooperative norms, the easier it is to resolve potential conflicts, compromise on political and social issues, and provide public goods. We believe that this width of the moral community matters in understanding interactions between different people, particularly as modern societies become more diverse. Soroka, Banting, and Johnston (2002:2) claim that “[b]onds of community may be more difficult to sustain as the population becomes more diverse” and that “[t]rust is aided by identification with fellow citizens.” We suspect that forms of trust, taken as predictors rather than dependent variables, should matter in the readiness of people to embrace others who are different from themselves, and help us understand the severity of the potential problem highlighted by Soroka, Banting, and Johnston. For this reason, we focus our analysis on contemporary industrialized societies, which have become increasingly diverse in recent years, potentially undermining the political attitudes necessary for these societies to function efficiently.

This article answers calls for empirical research that explores the consequences of distinct forms of trust (e.g., Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009:798–99). Across 11 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, our analysis reveals that the levels of “ingroup” and “outgroup” trust significantly affect people’s attitudes on a group of questions that measure what we refer to as nativism and civicness. Yet we also find that these two closely related trust concepts have markedly different impacts on these attitudes, thereby uncovering something of a paradox for contemporary

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1Freitag and Traunmüller (2009), Gibson (2001), Herreros (2004), Uslaner (2002), Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland (2007), Newton and Zmerli (2011), Zmerli and Newton (2008), and Zmerli and Hooghe (2008) represent some of the empirical contributions to research on formation of different types of trust. As Freitag and Traunmüller point out, “[t]he empirical component has been neglected, due mainly to lack of adequate data addressing various aspects of different forms of trust” (2009:783). Further, most empirical work in this field focuses on single-country case studies: Freitag and Traunmüller tested whether there are “spheres of trust” using data from a German panel, Gibson’s study focused on Russia, while both Uslaner and Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland’s research was based on U.S. data.

2Throughout this article, we use the terms ingroup and outgroup trust interchangeably with particularized and generalized trust, respectively. We prefer the use of ingroup and outgroup trust rather than another terminology both because the terms are simple and straightforward, and because our conception of trust closely resembles that of Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011), who use these terms of trust.
diverse societies. Outgroup trust reduces nativist resentment while ingroup trust tends to increase it. However, ingroup trust varies positively and significantly with our civicsness measures, but outgroup trust does not. The divergent effects of these two types of trust on two important sets of political attitudes highlight the value of differentiating between types of trust, and provide important insights for current debates about the appropriateness of the traditional trust question (TTQ) as a measure of what is at root a multidimensional concept (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel, 2011; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008; Sturgis and Smith, 2010). Our findings support the assertion that “one cannot recommend measuring trust with just a single item as is often done in comparative research” (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008:530).

The next section reviews the debate about the conceptual meaning, dimensionality, and measurement of trust. Relying on a six-item question in the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), we then construct a two-dimensional measure that we use to examine the impact of forms of trust on nativism and civicsness while controlling for the TTQ. The final section concludes with implications of the findings and suggestions for further research.

The Thrust of Trust: Toward a Multidimensional Concept of Trust

A society in which generalized trust—trusting individuals whom we do not know personally—is abundant is said to be able to resolve a variety of coordination problems. The presence of generalized trust within a society reduces transaction costs associated with principal-agent problems, encourages more cooperative behavior in prisoner’s dilemma situations, and helps avoid issues of asymmetrical information. Higher levels of generalized or outgroup trust are also associated with increased confidence in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy (Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011), as well as less corrupt and more trustworthy and generous institutions (Uslaner, 2002). Research also suggests that societies with high amounts of outgroup trust experience higher growth and investment rates (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), higher tax compliance (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Scholz, 1998; Scholz and Lubell, 1998), higher income and education rates (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Slemrod and Katuscak, 2005), and increases in the efficiency of organizations and reduction of moral hazard (Miller, 2001), to name a few.

There is growing agreement that trust comes in two forms. Various terminologies have been proposed such as “strong” and “weak” ties (Granovetter, 1973), “bonding” and “bridging” trust (Putnam, 2002), “particularized” and “generalized” trust (Uslaner, 2002), all basically claiming that there are different radii of trust that ripple out in concentric circles from the individual: particularized or thick trust is extended to people whom we know, to family, friends, to the locality, to kith and kin. However, these ripples begin to flatten out the larger the radius from the individual becomes. Such trusters have a
very strong sense of “us” versus “them.” They are ready and willing to cooperate with others, as long as the others are like themselves (Goodhart, 2004). The biggest challenge, however, is properly measuring these different types of trust.

Most survey research on trust relies on the TTQ, which has become a staple question in the WVS and the European Social Survey (ESS), among others. The TTQ is worded as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” According to Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011:787), this question was meant to measure “trust in a wide and unfamiliar circle of others, rather than in a small circle of close and familiar others,” and Uslaner (2002) also reports that people indeed think of trust in these general terms. Reeskens and Hooghe, however, find that “almost every word [in the TTQ] is problematic” (2008:516), and Sturgis and Smith (2010) conclude that when respondents in their study of Great Britain (2007/2008) answered “most people” in the TTQ, they had thought about people who were known to them personally not in terms of “unknown others,” potentially seriously impairing the interpretation of empirical results. This leads some to the conclusion that “relying on a single item [the TTQ] measurement amounts to skating on thin ice” (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008:530).

The fifth wave of the WVS includes a battery of six questions that allow researchers to more directly examine different types of trust. The six questions (V125–V130) are as follows: “I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all?” The groups are: “your family,” “your neighborhood,” “people you know personally,” “people you meet for the first time,” “people of another religion,” and “people of another nationality.” The answer options were as follows: “trust completely,” “trust somewhat,” “do not trust very much,” and “do not trust at all.”

In a detailed analysis of the TTQ, using these new questions that measure the radius of ingroup and outgroup trust, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel find that “the question seems to work well in Western and affluent nations, but less well in other parts of the world . . . ” (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel, 2011:800). More recently, Wollebaek, Lundåsen, and Trägårdh (2012) identified three types of trust within 33 Swedish municipalities: particularized, generalized, and what they termed “community” trust. We take this variation in the applicability of the TTQ and growing interest in multidimensional conceptions of trust as the point of departure for our analysis.

In the next section, we further explore the two-dimensional concept of trust, which we follow Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011) in referring to as “ingroup” and “outgroup” trust. However, in addition to examining the

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3 Unfortunately, the answer categories are not the same across the WVS, GSS, and ESS. While the WVS forces the respondents into a dichotomy (can be trusted/cannot be too careful), the GSS adds a third option, “depends,” and the ESS has an 11-point scale (0–10).
impact of the two-dimensional trust measures on nativism and civicness, we also include the TTQ as a control, allowing us to observe whether it has a unique impact above and beyond the impacts of “ingroup” and “outgroup” trust. We restrict our sample to the modern industrialized countries for which the six trust items were available (Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Given Delhey, Newton, and Welzel’s (2011) finding that the TTQ works well in Western affluent nations, it is of particular interest to see whether the TTQ aligns either with the “ingroup” or “outgroup” form of trust, or whether it taps a different dimension altogether.

Constructing Ingroup and Outgroup Trust

Social identity theory is animated by the dichotomy of “us” versus “them” based on categorical differences such as race, gender, religion, “native,” or “stranger,” and any other conceivable difference. Social psychologists have examined these differences in most detail (Allport, 1954; Sherif et al., 1961; Tajfel, 1981, 1982, among many others), but such issues have also garnered the attention of ethologists (van de Berghe, 1981; Butovskaya et al., 2000; Salter, 2004) and, more recently, of political scientists and economists (McCarty, 1993; Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Lindert, 2004, among others) as well as of philosophers (Walzer, 1983; Wrong, 1994; Miller, 2000, among others). Generally, social identity theory posits that the self-esteem of ingroup members rises when the category to which they belong is positively evaluated. A similar effect is observed when members of an outgroup are negatively evaluated and, additionally, ingroup bias is also strengthened when members perceive a threat from an outgroup.

In order to sharpen the specification of generalized trust, we will use the six-item trust measures from the fifth wave of the WVS to produce a two-dimensional map of ingroup and outgroup trust. A two-dimensional map of forms of trust has three distinct advantages: first, the six items in the fifth WVS wave allow us to explicitly specify both types of trust. Second, it allows us to measure the intensity of trust on each dimension. In other words, it is possible to derive ingroup trust (high/low) as well as outgroup trust (high/low), suggesting that ingroup trusters do trust, perhaps to an even higher degree than outgroup trusters, but that their trust orbit is limited to people they know or with whom they share categorical similarities such as race, region, language, or religion. Third, it will allow us to measure the relationship between the two, which is important because the exact relationship between these two forms of trust is unclear. Our analysis will therefore help us understand if ingroup and outgroup trust should be thought of as orthogonal to each other (i.e., no relationship between the two) (Newton, 2001), or a zero-sum, negative relationship as others have argued (Banfield, 1958; Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2000, 2002; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Newton, 1999; Stolle, 2001,
2002). Our analysis may also be in line with those that find ingroup and outgroup trust are positively related to each other (Whiteley, 1999; Bahry et al., 2005; Yosano and Hyashi, 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Putnam, 1993; Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009), or even that “it [particular trust] seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient cause of more general forms of . . . social trust” (Newton and Zmerli, 2011:194). Finally, if there is a distinction between forms of trust, we suspect that they should have predictably different impacts when it comes to questions of nativism and civicness, which we explain more fully in the following section.

The Dependent Variables: Nativism and Civicness

As we indicated above, different forms of trust animate many outcomes, which explains the burgeoning literature on the consequences of trust. We have chosen nativism and civicness as dependent variables because the distinction between “us” and “them” looms large and differences in types of trust should systematically affect the perception of respondents in these two areas of attitudes. If it is indeed true that “ingroup” and “outgroup” trust capture different radii of cooperative norms, then this should manifest itself in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. Similarly, even among native citizens, wider radii of trust should predict more civic behavior than shorter radii of trust. What nativism and civicness both have in common is an emphasis on community: nativists see their own culture and ways of life threatened by foreigners (see, e.g., Barry, 2001; Huntington, 2004) while others argue that a decline in civic behavior will undermine the very foundations and working of democracy (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000, among others). Nativism is centered on the “us first” idea, a fear that strangers will undermine the traditional way of life, and is xenophobic and exclusionary. If it is indeed true that outgroup trust engenders a broader sense of community, mutual aid, inclusiveness, reciprocity, tolerance, and solidarity, we hypothesize a negative relationship between that form of trust and our various measures of nativism.

Civicness, on the other hand, refers to participatory, solidaristic behavior that is communitarian in character and centered on the common good. It suggests a responsibility for the public good, the idea that obeying the laws, paying one’s fair share in taxes, not taking unfair advantage of social benefits, and that participating in voting is a duty that will make government work better and furthers the interest of all members of the community (Orviska and Hudson, 2002). Letki (2006:306) argues that “such sense of civic responsibility and respect for the norms and rules of the community enhance the willingness to comply with them, even when one is unlikely to be caught and if the threat of punishment is minimal.” Outgroup trusters should contribute to the provision of public goods because they trust others too, independently of whether they are kith and kin, of a different religion, race, or characterized by other differences. Hence, in terms of our civicness measures we expect outgroup trust
to buoy civicness. On the other hand, ingroup trusters should be less capable of involving themselves in their society as their circles of identity are drawn more tightly. For this reason, we hypothesize a positive relationship between ingroup trust and nativism and a negative relationship between ingroup trust and civicness.

Alternatively, if we conceive ingroup and outgroup trust as a continuum from a primordial, traditional, and authoritarian pole to one that is more cosmopolitan, open, and accommodating of difference, ingroup trust may be associated with more conservative attitudes on questions pertaining to civicness. In this scenario, it would be the individuals with the narrower, more restrictive form of trust that would find it more unacceptable to cheat on taxes, avoid payment for public services, or abstain from participating in parliamentary elections. Thinking of this sort undergirds the belief of many scholars that the welfare state project is viable only on the basis of some kind of primordial sentiments (see, e.g., Marshall, 1950; Walzer, 1983; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004; Miller, 2000, and others). If this were the case, we would actually see a positive relationship between ingroup trust and civicness.

In more general terms, we are interested in how different forms of trust affect the width of the moral community of individuals. To what extent do they see themselves as their “brother’s keeper”; how tightly drawn are their circles of identity and belonging? Outgroup trusters should have a higher capacity to contribute their “fair share” to society as they see themselves as part and parcel of a community; their attitudes should be consistent with an embracing of the “other” and with higher levels of public spiritedness. Primordial attitudes, on the other hand, should be more centered on ingroup benefits, skepticism toward newcomers, nativism, and perhaps a reduced willingness to contribute toward the common good.

For each dependent variable, we run two models: one with ingroup and outgroup trust as the central predictors (in addition to a series of control variables) and a second model that adds the TTQ to the other two forms of trust. This allows us to explore whether there is a difference between ingroup and outgroup trust, and the degree to which the TTQ either has significant/insignificant independent effects and whether it aligns itself with one or the other form of trust. The sample for our analysis consists of all industrialized countries queried by the fifth wave of the WVS for which data were available for all the models applied (with the exception of France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, in which two of the civicness items were not asked).

The reason for constraining our sample to industrialized societies is three-fold: first, according to Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011:800), the TTQ “seems to work well in Western and affluent nations,” meaning that equivalence issues are greatly reduced. Second, we want to keep as many potentially confounding effects, such as levels of democracy or development, at bay. Third, all of the countries in this sample have seen significant increases of
immigration over a number of decades, which animates nativism (Mudde, 2007), and these are also the “trilateral democracies” (sans Japan) that are said to have been afflicted by public apathy and disaffection with their governments, leading to widespread “civic malaise” (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). As a result, they should prove fertile ground for examining whether different forms of trust have systematically different effects on civleness and nativism. The next section derives the empirical measures for ingroup and outgroup trust, maps them against our set of industrialized societies, examines the relationship between them, and finally estimates their effects on a series of nativism and civiness models.

Methods and Findings

Wave 5 of the WVS includes several questions measuring respondents’ levels of trust toward a variety of different “types” of people. For example, respondents are asked to record their level of trust toward their family members and neighbors, as well as people of different religions or nationalities. Given our theoretical definitions of ingroup and outgroup trust, we expect some subsets of these survey responses to be causally connected to each of the two different types of trust. Because we have theoretical expectations about the components of the two forms of trust, we estimate confirmatory factor models (CFAs).

We estimate a two-factor CFA allowing the two latent variables to be correlated to one another. Each factor is estimated using three observed indicators. The primordial trust factor is causally connected to the questions asking about family, neighbor, and personal acquaintances (V125–V127), whereas the cosmopolitan trust factor is connected to the questions regarding people of different religions, nationalities, and new acquaintances (V128–V130). These survey questions are all measured on four-point scales, making the standard CFA assumption of multivariate normality among the observed indicators unrealistic. As a result, our model takes the categorical measurement of the observed indicators into account using polychoric, rather than Pearson, correlations. The data cover 11 countries with a total of 13,051 respondents. Note that results are replicated in country-by-country factor models.

Following the notation of Kolenikov (2009), the CFA models take the following general form:

\[ Y_{ij} = \mu_j + \sum \lambda_{jk} \xi_{ik} + \delta_{ij}, \quad j = 1, \ldots, p, \]

where \( i \) indexes observation, \( j \) indexes the observed indicator, \( k \) indexes the latent factor, and \( p_k \) is the number of observed indicators associated with each of the latent factors. The \( y_{ij} \)-s represent observation \( i \)'s response to survey question \( j \). \( \lambda_{jk} \) is the factor loading relating indicator \( j \) to factor \( k \) and the \( \mu_{j} \)-s
TABLE 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Loading on Factor 1: Ingroup Trust</th>
<th>Loading on Factor 2: Outgroup Trust</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate family</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal acquaintances</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you first meet</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another religion</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another nationality</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>13,051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>3,456.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>123,194.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>123,381.26</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Countries included are Australia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Results from a confirmatory factor analysis of a polychoric correlation matrix. In order to obtain the CFI and RMSEA fit statistics, we calculated an additional factor analysis of a Pearson’s correlation matrix.

are the intercepts. The $\xi_{ik}$s are the latent factors and the $\delta_{ij}$s are measurement, or unique, errors.

Before estimation, we must assess the identification of our model. First, we set the mean and variance of the latent variables to zero and one, respectively. Next we compare the number of estimated parameters in our model to the degrees of freedom. In order for the model to be identified, the degrees of freedom must equal or exceed the number of free parameters. In our model, we have six observed indicators that correspond to 18 free parameters plus one additional parameter to model the correlation between the two latent factors. The degrees of freedom equal the number of nonredundant elements in the variance/covariance matrix of the observed indicators, which is given by

$$df = \frac{p(p + 1)}{2},$$

where $p$ is the number of observed indicators. Given six observed indicators, this yields 21 degrees of freedom, which exceeds the 19 free parameters to be estimated in the model. Finally, given that each factor is related to at least three observed indicators, the residual covariances of these indicators are assumed to be zero, and each observed indicator loads on one and only one factor, the model is identified under the three indicator rule (Bollen, 1989). We estimated the model via full information maximum likelihood using Mplus (Muthén and Muthén, 2008).
Table 1 presents factor loadings for each of the six observed indicators of trust. As is apparent from the table, there are strong loadings between trust in immediate family, trust in neighbors, and trust in personal acquaintances on the first factor, what we call ingroup trust. In addition, trust in people one first meets, trust in individuals of another religion, and trust in individuals of another nationality load highly on a separate factor, which we call outgroup trust. The two factors correlate at $r = 0.67$, indicating that there is a moderately strong relationship between the two types of trust. It appears that people who elicit ingroup trust also have the capacity for outgroup trust. In other words, we find, unlike Newton (2001), that the relationship between the two dimensions is not orthogonal; rather, there is a positive relationship. However, a correlation of 0.67 also suggests that there is a fair proportion of variation in each factor that is unique to each theoretical concept.

Using the results of the CFAs, we generate factor scores for each individual in our sample for both types of trust. We prefer this method to additive indices, which do not account for variation in the loadings of each constitutive variable on the latent factors. We display the mean value of each type of trust across

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4 We also generated the trust variables using additive indices, and results are substantively the same.
the countries in our sample in Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, Sweden displays the highest levels of ingroup and outgroup trust and fellow Nordics of Norway and Finland also display high levels of trust. It is equally unsurprising, based on previous research (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 2007), to find Italy with the lowest amount of trust given the history of low trust in the southern part of the country in particular. The figure further demonstrates that the two dimensions of trust are positively related, a finding consistent with other results (Bahry et al., 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009; Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). Interestingly, however, although the two types of trust correlate positively with one another, later in this article we will show that they have a markedly different impact on attitudes toward nativism and civicness.

We identify four survey questions in the WVS that capture nativism and three that capture civicness, which are listed below:

**Nativism:**

1. “Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which one of the following views do you agree? Ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity (coded 1); Ethnic diversity enriches life (coded 10).” (V221)
2. “How do you feel about people from other countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?” (V124)
   - “Let anyone come who wants to” (assigned a 4)
   - “Let people come as long as there are jobs available” (3)
   - “Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here” (2)
   - “Prohibit people coming here from other countries” (1)
3. (V45) asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed with a statement about employers and the hiring of nationals over immigrants. We code respondents who felt that nationals should be hired over immigrants a 0, and those who felt that nationals should not be favored over immigrants as 1.
4. “Which of the following groups of people would you not like to have as neighbors?” (V37). If the respondent checked the immigrants/foreign workers box, we assign a 1. If not, we assign a 0.

**Civicness:**

“For each of the following actions, please indicate whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.”

1. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance (always justified coded 1, never justified coded 10; V200)
2. Avoiding a fare on public transport (always justified coded 1, never justified coded 10; V199)
3. Did you vote in recent parliamentary elections? (coded 1 if yes, coded 0 if no; V234)
We estimate a series of models with the ingroup and outgroup trust measures taken as predictors of each nativism and civicness variable. Each of the seven models includes a number of variables that previous research suggests have an impact on attitudes toward nativist and civic attitudes. Scholarship has found that females and respondents with more education display significantly less nativist resentment and more civic attitudes than males and those with less education. Additionally, older people as well as those who are poorer are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants and cultural diversity than younger respondents or those who are in a less precarious economic position (Crepaz, 2008:75–77). We expect similar trends to hold in our analysis as well. Others have also found life satisfaction to be positively related to interpersonal trust, with similar effects on democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1990:33/41). We therefore expect respondents who display higher levels of life satisfaction to be less likely to hold nativist attitudes and more likely to hold attitudes consistent with civicness. Although older respondents are expected to display more nativist attitudes, we do anticipate that they will be more likely to vote and less likely to find it acceptable to cheat on taxes or avoid fares (Crepaz, 2008). Finally, a number of studies have found that left/right orientation has an effect on attitudes toward welfare state principles and politics (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Edlund, 2003; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Gelissen, 2000; Jacoby, 1994), and we accordingly include the respondents’ self-placement on the left/right scale. We expect respondents further to the right of the left/right scale to display less support for immigrants, but are uncertain what impact a respondents’ left/right self-placement will have on our measures of civicness.

The number of observations varies across tables, as response rates fluctuated by question. The ethnic diversity and immigration policy questions were not asked in Britain, France, and the Netherlands, meaning these countries are not included in the models corresponding to these dependent variables. Age is measured in years, gender is measured dichotomously, with females coded as 1 and males 0, and income is sorted into 10 strata within each country. Education is measured on a nine-point ordinal scale, ranging from no formal education, coded as 1, to completed university education, coded 9. Left–right placement is measured with a question that asks individuals to report their ideology, with 1 indicating “left” and 10 indicating “right.” We also include a control for life satisfaction, which ranges from 1 to 10, with lower values indicating dissatisfaction with one’s life and higher values indicating satisfaction. To assure that ingroup and outgroup trust have predictive power beyond their association with generalized trust, we also control for generalized trust using the WVS question that asks respondents if they agree that most people can be trusted. Those who agree are coded 1, and those who do not are coded 0 (V23).

Regarding nativism, results in Table 2 provide strong evidence that ingroup and outgroup trusters display very different attitudes in regard to the benefits of immigration policy, ethnic diversity, the hiring of nationals, and having
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Matters</th>
<th>Immigration Policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 2</strong></td>
<td>Trust and Nativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant Neighbors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hiring Immigrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Diversity</td>
<td>Good Diversity</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
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Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Immigration policy estimated with ordered logistic regression. Diversity model estimated with binary logistic regression.

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immigrants as neighbors. Across each of the tables, the coefficient on the outgroup trust variable is positive and significantly related to the dependent variable. This positive association remains even when controlling for generalized trust. Alternatively, across each of the nativism models ingroup trust is negatively related to the dependent variable, meaning it is associated with higher levels of nativism, whereas outgroup trust is associated with lower levels of nativism; the opposite is true for ingroup trust. Again, the negative association between ingroup trust and the dependent variables remains even when controlling for generalized trust.

For the models that we estimated with ordered or binary logit, we display the relationships between ingroup and outgroup trust and the dependent variables graphically. Figure 2 displays the relationships between the trust variables and attitudes toward immigration policy. As shown in the right-hand panel of the figure, as outgroup trust increases, individuals are more likely to feel that all immigrants should be allowed, or that immigrants should be allowed if jobs are available. Conversely, as outgroup trust increases, individuals are less likely to feel that there should be strict limits on immigration or that no one should be allowed to immigrate to the country. As shown in the left-hand panel of the figure, opposite patterns are found in regard to ingroup trust.
The top panel of Figure 3 displays the relationships between the trust variables and attitudes toward the hiring of immigrants. As outgroup trust increases, individuals are more likely to feel that preference should not be given to nationals, while as ingroup trust increases, individuals are more likely to feel that employers should give preference to nationals. The patterns in the middle panel of Figure 3 are similar, with outgroup trusters more
likely to accept immigrants as neighbors and ingroup trusters less likely to do so.

We next turn to our civicness measures. Here, the relationships between the dependent variables and the trust measures are different. Across each of the models, displayed in Table 3, ingroup trust is positively related to civicness, while outgroup trust is negatively related or unrelated to civicness. These patterns hold when controlling for generalized trust. We display the relationships between the trust measures and the likelihood of voting in the bottom panel of Figure 3, as the turnout models in Table 3 were estimated with binary logistic regression. As is clear from the figure, turnout propensity is essentially unchanged as outgroup trust rises, but increases as ingroup trust rises.
Our results demonstrate remarkable differences in the attitudes and behavior of ingroup and outgroup trusters. In terms of nativism, whereas outgroup trusters are more likely to see value in ethnic diversity and to exhibit attitudes that are open to immigration and immigrants, the opposite is true of ingroup trusters. In terms of civicness, however, ingroup trusters are more likely to “accept the system” and participate in it. This is not true of outgroup trusters.

Interestingly, generalized trust tends to run in the same direction as outgroup trust in the models with the “nativist” dependent variables, whereas in the “civicness” models, it either has the opposite effect of outgroup trust or is insignificant. More specifically, it is insignificantly related to the “tax cheating” and “fare jumping” variables and positively and significantly related to the likelihood of voting. These diverging results indicate that the more highly specified ingroup and outgroup trust measures capture something quite different from the unidimensional trust question. However, scholars using the TTQ only have found no relationship between generalized trust and civic morality (Letki, 2006) or between generalized trust and legal permissiveness (Marien and Hooghe, 2011). While the emphasis of our research is on the difference between ingroup and outgroup trust measured on two dimensions, in the tables that use the unidimensional TTQ as a control, our findings converge with previous scholarship demonstrating no effect of generalized trust on civicness. This serves to highlight the importance of using a two-dimensional map of ingroup and outgroup trust as it reveals relationships that otherwise would remain obscured. Hence, we agree with Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011:801) that “comparative research should discontinue using unspecified trust [TTQ], at face value, as a measure of general trust . . . ”

Regarding the remaining control variables, patterns are also quite different across the nativism and civicness models. In the nativist models, age and rightward political ideology tend to relate to more nativist attitudes (or negatively with the dependent variables), while life satisfaction and education tend to be associated with less nativism. Results on the control variables are less consistent across the civicness models, though life satisfaction and age are consistently positively related to “civic” attitudes and turnout propensity.

Conclusions and Implications

The case for differentiating between types of trust has been made in previous theoretical studies and our findings add to a growing consensus that differentiating between trusts is conceptually accurate and of practical significance in furthering our understanding of the impact of trust in diverse societies. While our empirical analysis provides further support for the existence of two separate dimensions of trust, ingroup and outgroup, we have also shown that these two forms of trust are not orthogonal to each other.
Consistent with the expectations of Putnam (1993:144) and the studies of Bahry et al. (2005), Glanville and Paxton (2007), Freitag and Traunmüller (2009), Newton and Zmerli (2011), Zmerli and Hooghe (2011), and others, we find a positive relationship between these two types of interpersonal trust in our sample of West European countries, the United States, and Australia. Importantly, however, despite the positive relationship, it is striking to observe the systematically different impact of the two dimensions when applied to a set of political attitudes in the fifth wave of the WVS measuring attitudes toward nativism and civicness.

In all of the nativism regressions, ingroup trusters display more nativist attitudes than outgroup trusters even when controlling for the TTQ, which we added to explore how ingroup and outgroup trust would be affected by the unidimensional predictor variable for trust. When asked whether “ethnic diversity enriches life,” outgroup trusters strongly agree (together with generalized trusters) while ingroup trusters strongly believe that it tends to erode a country’s unity. Outgroup trusters, as well as generalized trusters, do not think that employers should give preference to nationals when jobs are scarce while ingroup trusters strongly believe they should. While outgroup trusters believe that immigration should be liberalized, together with generalized trusters, the coefficient for ingroup trust points in the opposite direction. Similarly, while outgroup trusters feel comfortable (and traditional trusters also) with immigrant neighbors, the ingroup trusters are uncomfortable living among immigrants.

When it comes to civicness, however, the relationship is reversed. Ingroup trusters significantly believe that it is not justifiable to cheat on taxes while the coefficients for outgroup trusters, together with generalized trusters, did not reach statistical significance. Strikingly, when asked whether it is unacceptable to avoid fares on public transport, ingroup trusters again tend to be more civic and find it unacceptable, while outgroup trusters believe that it is acceptable to avoid fares on public transport. Finally, when it comes to one of the most civic acts of all, namely, voting, it turns out that ingroup trusters, together with generalized trusters, are more likely to have said they voted in the most recent parliamentary election while outgroup trusters did not. Given the characteristics of outgroup trust, these findings are puzzling and call for further research into these matters.

Our findings suggest that those with more ingroup attitudes are trusters too, and that although their orbit of trust is more tightly circumscribed and more limited in its reach, this type of trust is important in fostering civically-oriented attitudes. In this our findings are somewhat consistent with research suggesting that primordial sentiments facilitate ingroup trust, a necessary component for the continued viability of modern welfare states (Marshall, 1950; Walzer, 1983; Freeman, 1986; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004; Miller, 2000; Huntington, 2004; Lindert, 2004). It is the outgroup trusters, however, who are able to transcend the boundaries of otherness, and for whom the traditional markers of identity are no deterrence to trust.
Three things stand out from these findings: first, significant differences exist in the attitudes of ingroup and outgroup trusters, even though the two types of trust are correlated with one another. Second, there are significant differences between the two-dimensional concept of trust and the TTQ. In the nativist battery of questions, the TTQ aligns with the outgroup dimension of trust, while for the civicness questions, it either has no effect (for two of the three questions) or it aligns with the ingroup dimension. These different outcomes demonstrate the value added of the multidimensional concepts of trust compared to the unidimensional TTQ. Finally, despite the communitarian outlook of outgroup trusters, the negative findings on the civicness questions are somewhat puzzling and require further examination.

Modern societies are coping with dramatic increases in immigration-induced diversity and the attendant political and social challenges. It appears that when it comes to issues of nativism, outgroup trusters have an expanded view of community, a belief in the shared fate of all that transcends ethnic, racial, and religious differences. Paradoxically, the same attitudes do not engender more civicness on the part of outgroup trusters. It is people with a wider orbit of trust who appear ready to embrace increasing diversity in our modern societies, but people with a more narrow orbit of trust are also needed to ensure the common good at home.

REFERENCES


